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Discussion
MAJORITY RULE: A DYSFUNCTIONAL POLITY
CONSENSUS: AN INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY
Peter Emerson *
Numerous electoral systems have been devised over the years but, in decision-making,
many forums still rely on the same procedure that was used in ancient Greece: majority
voting. Hence, majority rule. In many plural multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious societies,
the effects have often been negative.
This article considers voting procedures in three inter-related contexts: decisionmaking, elections, and governance. With regard to conflicts in Northern Ireland, the
Balkans, and Ukraine, it shows, both in decision-making and in elections, how simplistic
win-or-lose ballots have exacerbated tensions. And it then suggests a more inclusive polity
in which win-win voting systems might help to alleviate these differences.
Indeed, if a more accurate measure of the collective will could be deployed, and
if that mechanism were non-majoritarian, there would be little or no basis for majority
rule. Instead, reliance could be placed on inclusive structures: preference voting in
decision-making, and all-party coalitions in government.
*Initially

a submariner, Peter Emerson resigned his commission to teach math and physics in a school for the
poor in Kenya, a country where, it seemed, majority rule was primitive and inappropriate. Having learnt Swahili
and bought a bicycle, he then travelled throughout Central Africa, before settling in Northern Ireland in 1975.
The “troubles” were still raging, of course, and he soon realised that here too, this binary voting was divisive
and inaccurate. In 1985, at the height of the “Ulster says ‘NO’!” campaign, he and five colleagues stood outside
Belfast’s City Hall with a banner: “we have got to ‘say yes’ to something.” Then, before the IRA cease-fire, he
organised the first of many cross-community conferences with preference voting. Similarly, in 1990, on visits to
both Georgia and Yugoslavia and before the wars erupted, (he also speaks Russian and some Serbo-Croat), he
advocated power-sharing there as well. On returning to East Africa in 2003, he also warned of the dangers of
any referendum in South Sudan. He is now the director of the de Borda Institute—www.deborda.org—and his
latest work is From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics: Electing a Power-Sharing Coalition (Springer, 2016).
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INTRODUCTION
Parliamentary democracy is usually based, inter alia, on decisions being taken by a (simple
or weighted) majority vote. So governance is invariably a form of (single-party or
coalition) majority rule. While this majoritarianism has been used (and abused) in many of
the more established democracies, in some post-communist regimes and several former
colonies, such a polity has provoked division, bitterness, and in the worst-case scenarios,
war.
Accordingly, this article considers three features of democratic rule: (1) two types
of decision-making, one confrontational and one consensual, in referendums and/or votes
in parliaments; (2) two types of voting procedure for use in parliamentary and presidential
elections, and again, one is exclusive while the other is its opposite; and (3) three different
structures of governance: majoritarianism, consociationalism, both of which are
dichotomous, and a consensual polity which may be more pluralistic.
Democracy has evolved to the point at which, despite amazing advances in
computer science, elected chambers and countless organisations in civic society still
measure the “will of the people” and/or the will of parliament or that of committee
members by using the 2,500-year-old yes-or-no majority vote. This sometimes means that
decisions are based on the will of only 50% plus one of the given gatherings. Little wonder,
then, that some international forums prefer a purely verbal approach, but this too can be
imperfect or even inconclusive.
This ubiquitous belief in majoritarianism and the use of adversarial voting
procedures have sometimes been the catalysts of chaos. Accordingly, the text refers to zerosum decision-making as per the right of self-determination; secondly, to equally win-orlose multi-party elections; and thirdly, to the way electoral systems impact on party
structures and the most common and very divisive form of governance, majority rule. The
main focus shows how these three features have affected ethno-religious conflicts, not only
in the Balkans and elsewhere, but also in the most recent and on-going war in Ukraine.
Then, with due mention of those occasions when preferential voting has been used
in Northern Ireland, the article describes and advocates that which could prove to be a more
inclusive and peaceful democratic structure, a multi-option and preferential decisionmaking procedure and an equally inclusive electoral system.
The former could have at least one huge consequence, for if there were a decisionmaking procedure which facilitated a more accurate identification of the will of parliament,
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and if that decision-making procedure were non-majoritarian, there would be little further
justification for majority rule. A more inclusive structure could be used based on a
government of national unity (GNU), and such is needed, not only in western democracies
but especially in conflict zones, as in the Middle East.
Such a proportional, all-party executive could be elected by the relevant
parliament in an ethno-colour blind methodology, as will be outlined. Furthermore, as an
integral part of any consensual polity, both government and parliament would base their
(non-urgent) decision-making on consensus, either in a purely verbal procedure and/or via
a debate followed by a multi-option preferential vote.

MAJORITARIANISM: MAJORITY VOTING AND MAJORITY RULE
Many people think, “the foundation of democracy [is] that the will of a majority should be
paramount. It is not…” (Dummett 1997: 71). Democracy is for everybody, or as many as
possible, not just a majority. So the democratic process should involve, not the domination
of one faction over the rest, but an accommodation of (almost) all interests. Alas, “there is
a surprisingly strong and persistent tendency in political science to equate democracy
solely with majoritarian democracy” (Lijphart 2012: 6). Other forms, consociationalism
and consensus, are rarely discussed, and even Lijphart does not go beyond the former.
Accordingly, this article suggests a consensual polity: multi-option and
preferential voting in decision-making combined with a multi-candidate and preferential
electoral system (1) would be more inclusive, (2) would give a more accurate indication of
the collective will, (3) would be more suitable in a post-conflict structure, and (4) could
help to prevent political break down in other plural societies.
Electoral systems can and do vary a lot; decision-making in contrast hardly ever
changes. The former range from the simplistic single-preference systems like first-pastthe-post (FPP), and some proportional representation (PR), like the PR-list systems, to the
more sophisticated preferential systems. Alas, the UK and many former British colonies
use FPP. France and many countries from the old French Empire use the two-round system
(TRS). Several continental European countries use the PR-list, and the spectrum ranges
from the single-preference closed list systems, as in Israel, to multiple choice open systems,
as in Switzerland. To add to the mix, in 1949, Britain and the Allies imposed a two-tier
system on the Germans, multi-member proportional (MMP), which is part FPP and part

Majority Rule 29
PR-list; while earlier, as part of the 1920 settlement, the UK imposed the PR version of the
single transferable vote (PR-STV) on the Irish, North and South.
As Maurice Duverger points out, however, different electoral systems tend to lead
to different party structures: FPP usually produces a two-party system1 (Duverger 1955:
217); TRS fosters two or maybe three main parties; a two-tier form of PR-list, as in
Denmark, allows rather more parties to gain representation in parliament; while the
German MMP results in two main parties plus two or three smaller ones. All of these
electoral systems and party structures are regarded as democratic. However, if they are all
different and they all lead to a different set of elected representatives, they cannot all be
accurate representations of the people’s collective will.
In contrast, as noted, decision-making, be it in parliamentary divisions or in
referendums, is common to many forums. Although most democratic countries use simple
or weighted majority votes, there are a few exceptions: Denmark uses plurality voting in
parliament, Finland and Sweden use serial voting when debating amendments, and Norway
has a provision for, but rarely uses, TRS. Beyond Scandinavia, however, nearly every
democratic parliament is majoritarian.
Multi-option voting has been rather more widespread in referendums, usually
under TRS. New Zealand was the first in 1894 with a three-option poll, and in 1992 this
was followed by a ballot of five options. Other multi-option polls have taken place in many
countries, including Australia, Chile, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico and Sweden, with
perhaps the most inclusive ballot being the plebiscite held in Guam in 1982: there were six
possible constitutional settlements to choose from, with an additional one left blank for
anyone(s) who wished to campaign for a further policy option.
It must nevertheless be stressed that most parliaments use majority voting.
Furthermore, there is the widespread belief in majority rule. Better that than any minority
diktat, of course, but majority rule should not be regarded as the apogee of democratic
evolution. But the question arises: how best to determine the will of the majority? Many
parliaments resort to (simple or weighted) majority vote, one of the most inaccurate
measures of the majority will, let alone the collective will. Hence majoritarianism: majority
rule based on majority voting.
In a two-party structure, the larger party forms the government. In a multi-party
structure where, as often happens, no one party has more than 50% of the seats, there may
be a single-party or coalition minority administration, as can happen in Canada and
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Denmark, for example; or there might be a majority or a grand coalition, as is currently the
case in Finland and Germany, respectively. A majority coalition usually involves one big
party joining with one or more smaller ones, while a grand coalition is a coming together
of the two big parties.
Negotiations for such coalitions can sometimes be protracted. In 2010 in the UK
there were just two realistic possibilities, and a government was formed after only five
days: a two-party majority coalition of Conservatives and Lib-Dems. After the 2005
election in Germany, however, the two big parties in the Bundestag were in a dead heat,
and the three little ones were also very close to each other; there were thus six possible
majority coalitions of one-big-plus-two-small parties, as well as one possible grand
coalition. For those who believe in majoritarianism, any one of these seven very different
combinations would have been regarded as democratic.
The situation in India after the 1999 election was even more convoluted. The
previous 1998 government, itself a coalition of various parties, collapsed when a vote of
confidence was lost by only one vote: 269 to 270. The subsequent election was contested
by over forty political parties, some already in coalitions, and over thirty parties gained
representation, as did half-a-dozen independents. Any one of a huge number of
combinations, therefore, could have formed a majority government.
There are, then, many electoral systems, and quite a few forms of government.
For the most part, however, there is only one decision-making voting system in common
use: the simple or weighted majority vote. It is used in international forums like the UN
Security Council; in numerous parliaments; in referendums and constitutional plebiscites;
(and it is also used in law, business and civic society); not only in councils and parliaments,
therefore, it is indeed ubiquitous. Furthermore, virtually the only alternative to binary
voting in current use is the purely verbal methodology, and hence the all-night sessions of
various UN conferences and EU Councils of Ministers. There is remarkably little
awareness of multi-option voting for use in decision-making.
But just as a whole host of voting procedures can be used in elections, if and when
there are more than two candidates, so too other voting procedures could be used in
decision-making, if and when there are more than two options. Furthermore, as it were by
definition, in any democracy which aspires to the adjective pluralistic, in any debate which
is at all controversial, there should inevitably be more than two options “on the table”;
accordingly, on those occasions when attempts to find a verbal agreement are unsuccessful
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and when resort is made to a vote, there should also be more than two options on the
corresponding ballot paper.
Any one of a number of decision-making methodologies could be deployed. There
could be a plurality vote; or TRS; or STV (which in decision-making in the UK is known
as the alternative vote (AV); it is called instant run-off voting (IRV) in North America; and
preferential voting (PV) in Australasia; in this article, it is referred to as AV); there are also
approval voting and range voting; and then there are the Borda and Condorcet rules. Of
them all, only AV, Borda and Condorcet ask the voters to cast a full range of preferences;
only Borda and Condorcet take all preferences cast by all voters into account; and only the
Borda methodologies are non-majoritarian. It is this last category, therefore, that form the
basis of a consensual polity, to be discussed later on.

DECISION-MAKING: SELF-DETERMINATION
Decision-making is used both in parliaments and in referendums, but it is in the latter
function that it has often failed to facilitate the resolution of the dispute in question in a
peaceful manner.
In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson introduced the concept of selfdetermination. It was designed to be a principle by which a nation could overcome the
external problem of colonialism or aggression. It was never intended to be the basis by
which a society could resolve any internal problems of secession or irredentism.
“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they
freely determine their political status…” so stipulates Article 1.1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996. At
no stage does the Covenant mention which voting procedure should be used. It may
nevertheless be asked, can a people “freely determine” its status if someone has restricted
the voters’ choice to a yes-or-no dichotomy? To take a Croatian example—where the
referendum question was, in effect, “Are you Serb or Croat?”—how were the parents in,
or grown-up children of, a mixed marriage supposed to vote? and, more importantly, what
were those who might otherwise have wanted to vote for compromise supposed to do? In
a multi-option poll, as was the case in New Zealand’s TRS referendum on its electoral
system, at least one or more compromise options would be on the ballot paper.
Furthermore, in a preferential ballot, voters might be encouraged to state their individual
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compromise, in which case it should be possible to identify the collective compromise.
More of this in a moment.
There is little or no logic to the principle of self-determination by majority vote.


Step one: if in any one country, a majority wishes it to stay that way, then so be
it. (In 1991, a majority of 105 million voted to maintain the Soviet Union; it
collapsed within a year.)



Step two: if, however, a large minority wishes to secede, and if a majority of that
large minority approves, then this region may gain its independence. (In a 2011
referendum in South Sudan, with a 97.6% turnout, 98.8% voted for independence;
as one Timothy Othieno and others had predicted, it has since imploded: “…if the
South were to secede this would open a Pandora’s box in the whole of Sudan”
[Othieno 2006: 281]).



Step three: if, however, a small minority of that large minority wishes to secede,
and if a majority of that small minority of that large minority approves, then this
smaller region may also choose to go it alone. (In 1920, Ireland opted out of the
UK; so Northern Ireland opted out of Ireland and opted back into the UK again.
In theory, the city of Derry/Londonderry could have opted out of Northern
Ireland, and/or West Belfast could have turned itself into a sort of West Berlin,
and/or….) The principle of self-determination, or at least any majoritarian
interpretation of that principle, is a recipe for mayhem.

When Croatia opted out of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Krajina2 tried to opt out of Croatia;
when Georgia opted out of the Soviet Union in 1991; Abhazia opted out of Georgia; when
in 1992 Bosnia opted out of a truncated Yugoslavia, there was no majority but rather three
minority factions, and two of them tried to opt out of Bosnia as well: the Orthodox wanted
Republika Srpska and the Catholics wanted Herzeg-Bosna.
And so it goes on, ad infinitum. If in 2014, Scotland had opted out of the UK, the
Orkneys were thinking of opting out of Scotland. When Donetsk held its referendum on 11
May 2014, two districts in Donetsk asked to be placed in the neighbouring region (oblast)
of Dnipropetrovsk. Ad nauseam.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADVERSIAL VOTING PROCEDURES
There were numerous causes to the conflicts which afflicted the Balkans in the 1990s but,
as Sarajevo’s now legendary newspaper observed, “All the wars in the former Yugoslavia
started with a referendum” (Oslobodjenje, 7.2.1999).
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In most Republics, the first post-communist elections were held in 1990 under
TRS. In Croatia, for example, the Communist Party “insisted [on] TRS,” because it was
“still confident of victory” (Woodward 1975: 117–18). By the time the elections were held,
however, the party “had bloodlessly collapsed” (ibid.), and the nationalists were in the van:
Franjo Tudjman won 41.5% of the vote and thus 58% of the seats: that’s TRS. Two
mutually exclusive referendums followed, one in the Orthodox Krajina, one in the Catholic
part of Croatia; and then there was war.
Bosnia followed a similar pattern. In the elections, Ante Marković’s Reform
League might have been the second preference compromise choice of many voters, but in
any one round, TRS allows the electorate to cast only a first preference. The three largest
nationalist parties, one Catholic, one Muslim and one Orthodox, “pledged to band together
against the communists” (Silber and Little 1995: 232), and the result of what was little
more than a sectarian headcount, “laid the ground for the war that followed” (ibid.). These
three parties then used a consociational form of government, which meant that each could
veto any proposal; they failed to pass even a single law. Meanwhile, the EU insisted on a
majority vote plebiscite on self-determination but, “[on] the day of the referendum,
barricades were thrown up by Serb militants around various parts of Sarajevo” (Glenny
1996: 166). Within days, it was war.
The 2000 war in Kosova3 was also fought, in part, over a referendum. In 1991,
99.9% of an 87.0% turnout in Kosovo voted for independence, but the plebiscite was not
recognised. The 1999 Rambouillet Agreement wanted Slobodan Milošević to sign up for a
second referendum in Kosovo but, needless to say, he refused; so NATO bombed; so the
Russian foreign Minister, Viktor Chernomydin went to Belgrade; so the referendum clause
was removed; whereupon Milošević did sign and the war came to an end.
In contrast to the Balkans, referendums in the Caucasus were often held not before
but after the respective war, by which time most of the minority were either in exile…or
dead. In 1991, for example, three years after the first incidents of violence, 99.9% of an
82.2% turnout in Nagorno-Karabakh voted for independence, and only twenty-four
individuals voted against.
Such Stalinist results are not confined to the post-Soviet world. In the 1973 border
poll in Northern Ireland, 98.9% voted in favour. The turnout was rather less numerically,
only 58.7%, but no less sectarian. Nearly all the Protestants voted, and voted “yes,” while
almost all the Catholics abstained. Turkeys do not vote for Christmas, as the saying goes,
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and minorities do not vote at all, if and when there is no point. Such was also the story for
the Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgians in South Ossetia and Abhazia, the
Catholics in the Croatian Krajina, the Orthodox in (the rest of) Croatia, the Kosovars in
Serbia, the Orthodox in Bosnia and, as shall be seen in a moment, for the hapless Tatars in
Crimea in 2014.
When the result of a referendum is too close to call, as it was in Quebec in 1995,
the minority does vote. 49.4% voted for independence, 50.6% voted against, and the
turnout was massive: 93.5%. Results were also fairly tight in the 2014 Scottish referendum,
when 44.7% independence supporters lost to 55.3%, and the turnout was 84.6%.
In summary, as a means of facilitating the resolution of disputes on secession, the
two-option majority vote plebiscite is divisive, inappropriate and often counter-productive.
Despite everything, for many politicians, binary ballots remain the methodology of choice.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAJORITARIANISM
Majority voting has been part of many histories. In 1903, the All-Russian Congress of
Social Democrats met in London. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin lost the first vote but dismissed
the result as being of little consequence. “I do not think that our differences are so
important,” he said (Deutscher 1982: 71). One group then left the discussions. Lenin soon
changed his attitude because he won the next vote: nineteen in favour, seventeen against
and three abstentions; (so in fact, no faction had a majority). He nevertheless called his
larger minority the majority, bolshinstvo, and his side thus became the Bolsheviks.
Correspondingly, the members of the (other) minority, menshinstvo, were the Mensheviks.
The Bolsheviks took power in 1917, a coup d’état called a revolution, and the promised
election took place shortly afterwards. The Bolsheviks were trounced; the real majority,
the Social Revolutionaries, took 370 of the 707-seat Assembly, an absolute majority of
52.3%. Lenin therefore ordered his troops to take over the parliament in a second coup
d’état. The bolshevism which followed, a term derived from the word which originally
meant majoritarianism, was horrific.
Like Lenin, Máo Zédōng was also sometimes “in the minority” (Chang Halliday
2007: 252), but he too survived, and thrived, on a belief in the supposed rights of the
majority. Article V of the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution stated that “the minority
must obey the majority,” while Article III urged all members “to promote the interests of
the majority” and “to unite with the majority” (Schram 1969: 329). It should also be pointed
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out that majority voting was used in some village meetings during the Great Leap Forward,
the world’s worst ever man-made famine: “participants voted to decide who would be
killed; one by one, potential victims’ names were read and votes were tallied. The process
lasted for hours” (Su 2011: 65).
A third tragedy, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was also caused, in part, by a belief
in majoritarianism. The colonial power’s original administration was imperialism, that is,
an ultimate form of minority rule. This meant that the Belgians were in charge; that the
Tutsis came next, the middle class; that the more numerous workers, the Hutu, were at the
bottom of the pyramid; and that a fourth much smaller group, the Twa, were just ignored.
Thus, when ID cards were issued in the 1930s, every native Rwandan was classified as
either/or, Tutsi or Hutu. With independence came a complete reversal of policies, and
minority rule was to be replaced by its opposite, majority rule, even though “Asking yesor-no questions is very unAfrican.”4 As a result, the losers of yesterday could be the
winners of tomorrow. When the Interahamwe launched its appalling massacre, it used the
slogan “Rubanda nyamwinshi,” that is, “the majority people” (Prunier 1995: 183).
Despite these horrors, in parliaments and councils the world over, many people
continue to believe in the “mystique of the majority” (Dummett 1997: 71), the mistaken
notion that democracy should be based on decisions taken by majority votes. Hence, in the
US, for example, if and when one House is dominated by a party which is different, either
to that which is in the majority in the other House and/or to that of the President, the
administration becomes dysfunctional. Likewise, in the UK, parliament uses the majority
vote, even on those rare occasions when there are more than two options under discussion.
In 2003, the House was debating the 100-year-old problem of reforming the House of
Lords. There were five options “on the table.” Lord Meghnad Desai said any use of the
majority vote would be “daft” (Hansard, 22 January 2003), but democracy, or so many
believe, “works on the basis of a decision by the majority” (Government of Ireland 1996:
398). They took five majority votes, one for each option, and lost the lot. The late Robin
Cook MP then tried to introduce a form of preferential voting but in vain, for that “would
have involved,” he later bemoaned, “the technological development of a pencil and a piece
of paper, which was far too big a step for our parliament and its medieval procedures”
(Emerson 2012: 23).
ANOTHER CONFLICT: UKRAINE
In 2015, in the wake of the murder of Boris Nemtsov, the latest of many dissidents and/or
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journalists who have been eliminated in Russia, it is all too easy to criticize Vladimir Putin.
Indeed, for a long time now, the latter has been ruling like a Tsar, adjusting “democracy”
as required to suit his own ambitions. He is not the only politician to adjust the electoral
system to suit his own purposes, of course. Like so many other rulers and even dictators,
however, he does not bother to adjust the majority vote, for the latter is the perfect
instrument for those who might want to dominate decision-making: they choose the
question, and the question is (not quite) always the answer. (The only dictator to lose a
binding referendum was Augusto Pinochet, in his third such plebiscite in 1988 in Chile;
while in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe lost a non-binding ballot in 2000.) Putin was President
from 2000 to 2008; next he served as the power behind that throne, just to comply with the
constitution; and following new elections, he returned as the elected leader in 2012. That
said, while Putin has definitely been guilty of exacerbating the conflict in Ukraine, it must
also be pointed out that the West could have pursued wiser policies.
Initially, in 1991, when Ukraine received its independence, the West advocated
majoritarianism; as noted above, this usually means elections by any one of many electoral
systems, the formation of any combination of parties such that it forms a majority in the
parliament, but decision-making in referendums and/or in votes in parliament, by only one
of several systems, namely the (simple or weighted) majority vote.
Everything, therefore, was adversarial. Ukrainians speak a variation of the same
tongue, either Ukrainian and/or Russian; nearly everybody is Slav, the one obvious
exception being the above mentioned Crimean Tatars; and nearly everyone is Christian,
Catholic or Orthodox, the latter either Russian, Ukrainian or Uniate. Politics, however, is
divisive. So the people divided. Everything was either/or: either pro-West or pro-Russia,
either ethnic-Ukrainian or ethnic-Russian (to use the nonsensical descriptions employed by
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE, amongst so many
others).5 Everything was win-or-lose.
In the 2004 presidential elections, the winner was to be either Viktor Yushenko
or Viktor Yanukovich, and in 2010, either Yanukovich or Julia Timoshenko. The candidate
with 50% plus one of the votes was to get 100% of the power, while the loser with maybe
49% got nothing. In government, especially after Ukraine adopted a more parliamentary
democracy in 2005, it was majority rule. So in parliamentary votes or referendums, 50%
plus one was again the threshold. This, after all, is democracy, or so they say. It was the
same in Scotland on 18 September 2014 where, “the UK and the Scottish
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governments…made clear they will abide by the result, even if it is fifty per cent either
way plus a single vote” (The Guardian, 17 September 2014).
The principle of majority rule is dominant, and thus it remains… until it all goes
horribly wrong. By February 2014, the situation in Kiev had turned violent. The EU, which
had been promoting the win-or-lose politics of majority rule, now changed its mind, totally,
and rushed over to Kiev to advocate the very opposite, power-sharing. Hence, on 20th of
that month, Yanukovich agreed “to early presidential elections, the quick formation of a
coalition government with the opposition… [and a] new government of ‘national
unity’…within 10 days” (The Guardian, 21 February 2014). It was all too late. He fled to
Russia later that same day.
If the EU had advocated all-party power-sharing back in 1991, then maybe the
civil war of 2014 could have been avoided. As it happened, the situation just got worse and
worse. On March 16, Crimea held its referendum. The West protested, firstly, about the
presence of Russian troops on the ground, and secondly, about the absence of any
Ukrainian options on the ballot paper. But few if any complained about the use of a
majority vote; after all, so they continued to say, that is democracy. Putin was certainly
involved in Crimea but not, initially, in the consequences of those events in Eastern
Ukraine: thus, at the time, he did not recognise the referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk,
which took place on 11 May 2014. Since then, however, despite his protestations to the
contrary, Russia’s involvement in the war in Ukraine has been extensive.
The point, however, is this. If the West had advocated power-sharing, if not in
1991, then at least when the situation started to deteriorate in 2013; or if, better still, the
West actually practiced a form of power-sharing, then maybe the situation could have been
saved. According to Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-linked analyst, “Putin laid down several
conditions…which he saw as a compromise solution… ensuring that Ukraine's interim
government involved a coalition of all political forces, including Yanukovych's Party of
Regions” (The Guardian, 24 March 2014). “If this had happened,” [Markov added],
‘Crimea would still be part of Ukraine’.”
The conclusion, yet again, is stark: majoritarianism can be, and often is, a cause
of war. Why, then, does the West continue to believe in this most primitive and divisive
measure?
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THE “MYSTIQUE OF THE MAJORITY”
The full quotation from Markov reads as follows: “Putin laid down several conditions to
western leaders which he saw as a compromise solution but [which] they viewed as
unwarranted meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. The conditions included
ensuring that Ukraine's interim government involved a coalition of all political forces,
including Yanukovych's Party of Regions, [and] disbanding all armed revolutionary
factions....” There it is: “[power-sharing,] which western leaders…viewed as unwarranted
meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state...” (ibid.). As far as the West was
concerned, until Ukraine imploded, or so it seemed, it had to have majoritarianism. The
West is indeed hooked on this “mystique of the majority.”
It was the same in Kenya. Initially, the UK, the former colonial power, advocated
majority rule, and this despite the fact that, in Swahiliphone Africa (as the word ‘baraza’
would imply)6 if not throughout the sub-Saharan continent, the Kinyarwanda word is
‘gacaca’, while in French-speaking West Africa, the term is ‘palabre’, “Majority rule was
a foreign notion” (Mandela 1994: 25). Then, when everything went horribly wrong in the
wake of the FPP elections of 2007, the British advocated a different policy, again the
opposite of the original majoritarianism, namely, power-sharing.
It is not that different in Iraq, where the forces of Isis have now taken over huge
swathes of the country and where the West knows that power-sharing in Baghdad was and
is essential. Instead of majority rule, which it knows would be unworkable, it calls for
“inclusive government.”
Libya is another example. Sadly, the West failed to respond to the words of
Libya’s Foreign Minister, Abdul Ati al-Obeidi who in April 2011 called for international
observation of supposedly free elections, and opted to continue with its military
intervention. Since then, and since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, the country has
imploded as various factions seek domination. Hence the numerous calls for a “government
of national unity.”
Likewise, in Afghanistan. In a land where tribal divisions are huge, there is first a
win-or-lose presidential election under TRS. Amid allegations of vote rigging and other
forms of electoral fraud, the two sides become embittered. Eventually, under international
arbitration, a win-win resolution is found and a form of power-sharing is established.
Would it not have been more sensible if Afghanistan had used a less adversarial electoral
system, one more suited to the very concept of power-sharing? One obvious win-win
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methodology could have been the original U.S. system in which not only does the winner
become the president, but the runner-up becomes the vice-president (U.S. Constitution
1787: Art II, Section 1 para. 3).
In summary, it may be asked: would it not indeed have been better if Kenya had
inherited a form of power-sharing when it first received independence? Or too Rwanda?
Or if, in 1990, in the various Republics of Yugoslavia, a preferential electoral system had
been used? or if their plebiscites had been multi-optional? And, it is worth repeating, would
it not have been wiser if, in Ukraine, from the very beginning, the West and in particular
the OSCE had promoted inclusive voting procedures, both in elections and in decisionmaking, as part of a form of power-sharing?
On 29 June 2015, Britain’s David Cameron said, "Whether it's Iraq, Syria or
Libya, the same thing is required... governments that represent all of the people."
Meanwhile, in his own government, there is no-one to represent the Scots, let alone those
of a non-Tory political ideology.

A MORE INCLUSIVE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
In a plural society, as noted earlier, whenever a complex and/or contentious problem is in
question, there will invariably be a plurality of options “on the table.” If, as often happens
in politics, a verbal consensus proves to be elusive, the debate will invariably boil down to
a choice of just a few options. In which case, a final vote may be taken, but there should
always be the same plurality of options, or at the very least a short list of about four to six
options, on the ballot paper.
Admittedly, there are a few occasions when a political dispute does actually
involve just a dichotomy, and one obvious example relates to the question, “which side of
the road shall we drive on?” The only country ever to hold a referendum on this question,
Sweden in 1955, actually had three options on the ballot paper: “left,” “right” and “blank.”
If, then, a committed democrat was actually indifferent on this topic, he/she could choose
to vote “blank” and, as it were, go with the flow. Therefore, even on what should be those
rare occasions when a dispute is indeed reduced to just two options, there could well be
more than two ways of voting. In today’s world of plural societies, therefore, most serious
(but non-urgent) disputes should never be subjected to a blunt choice of only two options.
Scotland did not have to be independent, yes or no; it could have got “devo-max”
(maximum devolution, as the third option was called, though it was not included on the
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ballot paper). In fact, of course, the Scots have now got devo-max, even though no-one
voted for it. So too in “normal” societies, to take a current example from the UK parliament,
tax rates do not have to be 50%, yes-or-no; they could be 40, 45, 50, 55, or even a
compromise between the two most popular ones, such as can be calculated with a high
degree of precision in consensus voting, which will be discussed in a moment.
More to the point, Crimea did not have to be Russian, yes or no? Croatia did not
have to be totally independent of Serbia, yes or no… only later, if all goes to plan, to be reunited with Serbia in the EU. And so it goes on.

CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING
In current majoritarian practice, when a motion is put, parties are allowed to suggest
amendments to this clause or that. Next, in debate, these various amendments may be voted
on; and when that process is complete, there is a final yes-or-no vote on the substantive. In
a word, everything is dichotomous.
Consensus voting, in contrast, is more flexible. Any party to the debate can
propose a motion, but every motion must be a complete package. Even when one party
agrees with most of a particular motion and wishes to amend just one small part of it, that
party must nevertheless propose a complete package.
When the debate starts, a team of consensors as they are called allow every
relevant option to be included, or at least those which comply with a previously adopted
norm like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; all options “on the table” are then
listed, in summary perhaps, on a computer screen and, if need be, in full on a dedicated
web-site. In the debate itself, participants may ask questions, seek clarifications, suggest
composites, or even move a new policy option, again as a complete package (though at any
one time, any one party may sponsor only one option, of course). As the debate proceeds,
the total number of options under discussion may gradually come down to single figures.
If at the end of the day, only one option remains, this may be taken to be the verbal
consensus. If not, if there are still a few options in dispute, then the chair may ask the
consensors to draw up a final (short) list and, as implied above, and especially if the subject
is controversial, this will normally consist of between four and six options. The chair first
asks if every party which has proposed an option agrees with the way the consensors have
incorporated their proposal, either verbatim or edited or in composite, into the final list,
and, when all concerned are content, he/she then calls for the vote.
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CONSENSUS VOTING
No-one votes against anybody or anything. Rather, albeit in their order of preference,
participants vote in favour of (one, some or hopefully all of) the options. Preferences are
then translated into points, the points are totaled, and the option with the most points is the
winner. At best, this outcome is the option with the highest average preference, and an
average, of course, involves everyone who votes, not just a majority of them.
Let it be assumed that the ballot consists of five options. In a Modified Borda
Count (MBC), the protagonist knows that success depends upon the preferences cast by
every voter. It is therefore worth her while to talk to everyone, especially any erstwhile
(majoritarian) opponents, so to persuade them to give her option not a fifth but a fourth,
third or even a second preference. The MBC is inclusive.
In an MBC ballot of n options, a voter may cast m preferences, where n ≥ m ≥ 1,
and points are awarded to (1st, 2nd … penultimate, last) preferences cast according to the
rule (m, m-1 … 2, 1). Accordingly, in a five-option ballot, he who casts just one preference
gives his favourite just one point; she who casts two preferences gives her favourite two
points (and her second choice 1 point); while he who casts all five preferences give his
favourite option five points, (his second choice four points, etc.). The mathematics of the
MBC thus encourages voters to submit full ballots,7 and experience over the years confirms
this to be the case. In so doing, each voter in effect recognises the validity of their
neighbours’ aspirations. The MBC is indeed inclusive. It is also “the soundest method of
identifying the [option which] is most generally popular with the electorate, or at least the
most acceptable” (Dummett 1997: 71).
The author’s first use of this methodology was in a public meeting held in Belfast
in 1986. Though still eight years before the cease-fire, the 200 plus participants included
both Unionists and Republicans, the public and paramilitaries, politicians and professors.
After a day of workshops and plenaries, those present voted in a ten-option preferential
ballot, and the most popular option was for “Northern Ireland to have power-sharing and
devolution, under a tripartite Belfast-Dublin-London agreement.” It was like a mini-Belfast
Agreement, just twelve years ahead of its time.
A further experiment was held in 1991 with electronic voting, and here too a
consensus was identified. Furthermore, there was a guest from Sarajevo, and thus was
made, six months before the fatal referendum, an impassioned plea against the use of any
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two-option ballot in Bosnia. Other demonstrations of the methodology have been
undertaken both at home and abroad, throughout Europe, in the U.S. and, most recently, in
China. They have all been successful.8
The MBC has also been used in public opinion polls, such as was conducted in
Scotland just two months before the 2014 referendum. In any six-option vote, there are in
fact 720 different ways of voting, 720 different opinions, or nuances that can be expressed
(see below). Of the 859 individuals asked to take part in the survey, 848 agreed to do so,
and 805 submitted valid votes: 659 were a full slate of six preferences, and a total of 164
different opinions (sets of preferences) were expressed (www.deborda.org/ home /2014/
8/22/2014-12-scots-referendum-6-option-survey. html.).
As noted above, majority rule is based upon the fact that decisions in parliaments
and referendums are taken by (simple or weighted) majority vote. If, then, the elected
chamber could make its decisions in a non-majoritarian methodology, such as the above
MBC, there would indeed be little or no further justification for majority rule, be it singleparty majority rule, or be it a two- or multiple-party majority or grand coalition. Instead,
the democratic structure could be such that, just as the parliament represents all the people,
so too the government, as in Switzerland, represents (as best it may) the entire parliament.

A MORE INCLUSIVE POLITY
Any political structure concerns the three elements mentioned in the introduction: decisionmaking, elections and governance.
Firstly, then, if and when non-urgent matters are controversial, decisions in
parliaments and/or referendums should be taken either in a verbal consensus or in a multioption preference vote, an MBC, so to identify the collective will of that parliament and/or
the entire electorate.
Secondly, elections should be based on a similar principle of inclusivity. The
MBC is not proportional, so the quota Borda system (QBS), should be used instead
(Emerson 2007: 39-60). As is the case with PR-STV, the mathematics of QBS encourage
each party to nominate only as many candidates as it thinks will be elected. In a divided
society as in Bosnia, for example, where perhaps, in one (sadly now hypothetical)
constituency, there might be Catholic, Moslem and Orthodox in a 30:30:30 ratio, each
religious grouping could expect to win two or, at the most, three seats. That said, because
of the “mystique of the majority,” many ethno-religious communities (and or political
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parties, for that matter) often divide into two, one larger party (wing) and one smaller
faction. What would probably happen, therefore, in a six-seater constituency, is that each
grouping would nominate two plus one candidates, with at least one non-sectarian party
also contesting the election as a major player.
In a QBS election, as in an MBC decision, the individual voter is encouraged by
the very mathematics of the counting procedure to cast a full ballot. Now there may be
other candidates from some other fringe parties standing but, if consideration is given to
just the main parties as outlined, then the voter is in fact (not forced but) incentivised to
vote, not only across the gender and party divides, but also across the ethno-religious
chasm.
The third feature concerns the formation of a government. Some conflict societies
have devised various formulas by which a cabinet can be chosen such that each faction is
represented in proportional due, but most of these formulas, as in Bosnia, Lebanon and
Northern Ireland, tend to perpetuate the very sectarianism the relevant peace agreements—
Dayton, Taif and Belfast respectively—were meant to overcome.
Meanwhile, those jurisdictions which have relied on a purely verbal process have
often wasted weeks if not months in protracted negotiations, trying to form a government.
In 2008, even with the assistance of the UN, Kenya took 70 days to establish a form of
power-sharing; Iraq in 2010 took 290 to do the same; and at about the same time, Belgium
took 541 days to form a cross-community majority coalition.
An obvious alternative approach would be for parliament to elect its government.
Each and every MP could cast his/her preferences in a two-dimensional ballot, not only for
those whom he/she wished to be in cabinet, but also for the portfolio in which he/she
wanted each of these nominees to serve. The appropriate methodology is known as the
matrix vote, (ibid.: 61–85), which is based on both the QBS and the MBC. In effect,
therefore, each MP would be encouraged to cast a full list of preferences and, like the
electorate, to cross the gender, party and sectarian divides. The system is proportional so
the outcome is (almost) bound to be an all-party coalition.
When the government has been appointed and the parliament commences its
business, standing orders must stipulate that non-urgent decisions can only be taken in
consensus, either in a purely verbal process or by concluding the debate with a preferential
MBC vote. In any such ballot, every option gets a certain number of points; this score is
then divided by the maximum possible score, so to get each option’s consensus coefficient.
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The latter varies from one, very popular, to zero, most unpopular. Parliament’s standing
orders would include certain thresholds and, if the most popular option were to exceed this
threshold, it could then be enacted. If not, if there were no consensus for a particular course
of action, (that is, if the leading options all got similar consensus coefficients), then such
an action would not be pursued and the debate would be resumed. An MBC can identify a
consensus opinion, only if (albeit at the end of the relevant debate) one actually exists.
Because there are only two ways of voting in any majoritarian parliament—it is
either A or B, much the same as in George Orwell’s Animal Farm: this good, that bad—it
is all too easy for the party whips to ensure that MPs of the governing party vote in favour
while their opposite numbers vote against. In a three-option ballot, however—on options
A, B and C—there are six different ways any one person may cast a full slate of preferences:
A-B-C, A-C-B, B-A-C, B-C-A, C-A-B and C-B-A. In a four-option vote, there are twentyfour possible ways of voting. As mentioned above, in a six-option poll, there are 720
different opinions which may be expressed. And so on. In other words, the very
introduction of the MBC and the matrix vote into parliament would spell the demise of this
function of the party whips, if not, indeed, of the very basis of party political patronage.
Instead, therefore, of a structure of governance in which there are the current
majoritarian norms of party loyalty in parliament and collective responsibility in cabinet,
the former principle would be more flexible and the latter would apply to the entire
parliament. In coming to an agreed decision by an MBC, parliament would choose the
option with the highest average preference—it might be the first preference of very few
but, if it is also the second or third of a very large number, then maybe it does indeed get
the highest consensus coefficient. If this is more than the pre-determined threshold, the law
may be enacted. Whereupon every MP would take on the collective responsibility to ensure
that it was successfully implemented; that or they would resign. 9
In today’s majoritarian world, a government based on a majority is supposedly
stable, at least in the short term. In a longer perspective, however, a country’s government
alternating from left-wing to right and then back again can hardly lay claim to such
stability. Furthermore, a majoritarian election can sometimes swing from left to right, based
on a tiny vacillation of that which is known, in the U.S., as Middle America, or in the UK
as middle England, namely, those people who sit at the peak of the normal distribution
curve of political opinion.
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In a consensual polity, a 2% swing in the electorate would lead to a roughly 2%
change in the composition of both parliament and government. In other words, a consensual
polity would be more appropriate for a species which would inherently be more peaceful
if it were less revolutionary and rather more evolutionary. There will still be disputes and
rivalries of course, some ideological, some personal, just as there are within parties. A
consensual polity, however, would always cater for the existence of compromise options,
which after all is a minimum requirement if accommodations are to be achieved.

CONCLUSION
As mentioned above, consensus voting—the MBC in decision-making, QBS in elections
and the matrix vote in governance—has been tried and tested in many scenarios. It works.
The methodologies are robust, accurate and, most importantly, ethno-colour blind. While
the exclusive majority vote encourages MPs and others to divide into opposing factions,
the use of inclusive voting procedures could create an altogether different milieu.
The temptations of power will still be there, of course. Accordingly, there will
still be a need for some additional rules on post rotations, free votes, time limits for
presidents or premiers, and so on. The introduction of consensus voting would nevertheless
make a huge difference, not only in the UN Security Council, international conferences,
meetings of EU ministers, national parliaments and regional assemblies, but also in
plebiscites on sovereignty, some of which, like the one proposed in a UN resolution of
1947 for Kashmir, could otherwise be disastrous.
Furthermore, when setting the consensus coefficient thresholds, it is possible to
calculate the latter to ensure that the required level means that members of both or all of
the larger ethno-religious groups in society are involved. In a nutshell, the adoption of such
a consensual polity could not only help the resolution of conflicts, it could also be part of
an attempt to circumvent others that could possibly emerge in the future: in Nigeria, for
example, where the religious-cum-geographical divide has already caused considerable
suffering; or in Taiwan let alone Xīnjiāng, where moves to independence already exist; or
in Russia itself, where the ethnic differences between the Slavs and the numerous
minorities, from the European Chechens to the Asian Chukchis, are far larger and more
numerous than any of the divides which exist in Ukraine. Alas, all too few politicians
question majoritarianism, even though it can be a cause of war.
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NOTES
1.

The very plural society of India is one obvious exception.

2.

Three areas in Croatia largely populated by those of the Orthodox faith; but before the
war started, there were even more Orthodox in Zagreb.

3.

Kosova is the Albanian-speaker’s spelling; the Serbian-speaker prefers Kosovo.

4.

At a press conference in Kigali on 6 March 2003, held to launch the Rwandan
Government’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission’s report on its Peace
Process, these words were said by a member of the audience, one Ephraim
Kanyarukiga of the Adventis University of Central Africa. The author was in
attendance.

5.

The author was an election observer for the OSCE in 2004, ’06, ’07, ’10 and ’14. Both
in Kiev and in a 2009 lecture to the OSCE in Warsaw, he advocated preferential
decision-making and electoral systems.

6.

The word refers to a meeting, usually of the elders, where reliance was invariably
placed on an unhurried verbal consensus.

7.

In its original form, as advocated by Jean-Charles de Borda, the Borda Count (BC)
followed the (m, m-1 … 2, 1) rule. Over the years, this was changed to (n, n-1 … 2, 1)
and then (n-1,n-2 … 1, 0), which does not cater for partial voting. In which case, as in
approval voting or even worse range voting, the BC could morph into a plurality vote,
which M de Borda bitterly opposed (Saari 2008: 197), (Emerson 2013: 353–58).

8.

Details of many of them are on www.deborda.org

9.

This is exactly what happens in other elected bodies, even with majority voting.
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